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 REGULATION IMPACT STATEMENT FOR EARLY ASSESSMENT 
Carrier Licence Conditions (Networks supplying Superfast Carriage Services to 
Residential Customers) Declaration 2014 
Overview and Introduction 
Since the early 2000s and the rapid rise of the Internet and broadband as platforms for the 
digital economy and online society, successive Australian Governments have grappled with 
the issue of how to achieve investment in next generation broadband networks capable of 
supporting future user needs. In parallel with this question, they have had to grapple with 
how this can be done in a manner that maximises competition recognising that much of the 
telecommunications customer access network, the last mile connection to individual 
customers which needed to be upgraded, has strong monopoly characteristics. This means 
that the firm controlling that network has significant market power, in terms of denying 
access to would-be competitors and potentially favouring its downstream operations over 
those of would-be competitors who gained access but had to compete with it. In Australia this 
meant Telstra, which owns the majority of access infrastructure. These issues would be 
compounded in the rollout of next generation broadband because if the logical upgrade path 
was followed, to fibre-to-the-node (FTTN), Telstra’s market power would be further 
enhanced. This is because if FTTN is to operate at optimal levels it eliminates the ability of 
competitors to operate their own DSLAM equipment from Telstra’s exchanges and it would 
generally not be cost-effective to install competing equipment in suburban nodes. This issue 
has been further compounded by the introduction of vectored VDSL2 for use with FTTN 
networks as optimal performance from vectoring can only be achieved if the lines servicing 
customers are operated by a single provider, who can manage interference problems. 
To address these dual problems – of investment in next generation broadband and 
maximising competition – competitive proposals were initiated by the Howard and Rudd 
Governments.  In September 2007, then Minister for Communications, Helen Coonan, sought 
proposals for the rollout of an FTTN network, supported by appropriate regulatory change.  
This process was terminated following the 2007 election. In April 2008, then Minister for 
Communications, Stephen Conroy, sought proposals for an FTTN or FTTP network, 
supported by funding of up to $4.7 billion and appropriate regulatory change. This process 
was terminated in April 2009 after the assessment panel found that none of the proposals 
received offered value for money.  
In light of these outcomes, in April 2009 the then Rudd Government announced it would 
establish a company, NBN Co, to build and operate a new National Broadband Network 
(NBN). The NBN would address the issue of investment in next generation broadband by 
being a predominantly FTTP network. It would address competition issues by operating on an 
open access, wholesale-only and non-discriminatory basis. To address long-standing 
concerns about Telstra’s ability and incentive to favour its own downstream operations over 
those of other access seekers, the then Government had the Parliament pass legislation that 
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 would require Telstra to functionally separate unless it chose to voluntarily structurally 
separate. Telstra chose to structurally separate by migrating its business to the NBN. 
In this environment, in March 2011 the Parliament also enacted legislation (Parts 7 and 8 of 
the Telecommunications Act 1997 – ‘the Act’) to require new networks that were to provide 
download speeds on more than 25 Mbps (‘superfast networks’) to residential and small 
business customers to operate on an open access, wholesale-only and non-discriminatory 
basis. The networks were also required to offer a Layer 2 [bitstream] wholesale service. 
These requirements were very similar to those applying to NBN Co and were designed to 
ensure that, having made the significant structural changes to the industry inherent in the 
construction of the NBN and the structural separation of Telstra, they were not undone by 
other new networks operating in the same way that had previously given rise to concerns (i.e. 
closed, vertically integrated, discriminatory, conflicted, self-preferring). As such the rules can 
and should be seen as seeking to pre-empt the kinds of structural problems that have plagued 
the wholesale customer access market in the past. 
In reality the Part 7 and 8 rules support competition in two ways. First, they mean that 
wholesale-only network operators are not unfairly disadvantaged in offering their services by 
having to compete with vertically integrated providers. Second, they mean service providers 
who do not (or cannot, in the case of Telstra) own certain network assets are not 
disadvantaged by having to compete with other operators who own their own networks and 
can advantage themselves over their competitors. 
While Parts 7 and 8 do not apply to ‘superfast networks’ existing before the rules took effect 
on 1 January 2011, their general policy objective is to apply NBN-consistent disciplines to 
new superfast networks. ‘New’ networks here included certain extensions and upgrades to 
networks that existed before 1 January 2011. However, Parts 7 and 8 included certain 
exemptions to minimise disruption to existing investments. Networks that were already 
capable of supplying superfast carriage services could, for example, be extended by less than 
1km. 
The Part 7 and 8 rules also had the effect of creating for NBN Co a more level playing field 
with which it could compete with any other comparable networks. This would have helped it 
in maximising its revenue, helping it to cross-subsidise services which it was required to 
provide in high-cost regional, rural and remote areas at a nationally uniform wholesale price. 
However, this was a secondary consideration and the provisions would not necessarily be 
sufficient to achieve this outcome. As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
provisions, if strong competition emerged, consideration would need to be given to a levy 
arrangement to fund those services on a competitively neutral basis. 
Following its election in September 2013, the Abbott Government confirmed its commitment 
to the structural separation of Telstra and the rollout of the NBN, although it has directed 
NBN Co to adopt a faster and more efficient multi-technology mix (MTM) in rolling out the 
network. Again, the Government is seeking to achieve the twin objectives of providing access 
to better broadband and maximising competition. 
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 On 17 September 2013 TPG Telecom announced plans to deploy a fibre-to-the-basement 
(FTTB) broadband network to an initial tranche of 500,000 residential and small business 
premises in five mainland capital cities (Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth). 
It plans to do so by using the PIPE fixed-line fibre network which it acquired in November 
2009. The network will offer very high-speed digital subscriber line (VDSL) services that can 
support download transmission speeds of more than 25 mbps. In this case the network will 
offer a newer version of VDSL, known as vectored VDSL2. The premises to be connected 
will mostly be within multi-dwelling units or multi-premises business centres, which will 
currently have in-building cabling and existing services supplied over Telstra’s copper 
network. TPG’s rollout would, in effect, replace Telstra’s network at the basement of the 
building (if the building owner agrees) and then connect to existing in-building cabling. 
TPG commenced supplying retail services over this network in September 2014. It is offering 
a service that is clearly a superfast carriage service, with a download transmission speed of 
between 50 Mbps and 100Mbps service over the network.1 TPG has said it will provide a 
wholesale service over its network, but has not provided further details. It is not operating on 
a wholesale-only basis.  
The ACCC has examined the compliance of the TPG network with the requirements of Parts 
7 and 8. The ACCC has concluded that the network is not captured by the rules because its 
network was already capable of being used to supply superfast carriage services to small 
business customers before 1 January 2011 and is not being extended at any point by more 
than 1km.  
While the immediate issue arises with TPG’s proposed network rollout, there is the 
possibility that other carriers may propose networks such as that proposed by TPG. 
On 11 September 2014 the ACCC announced that it would commence a declaration inquiry 
into whether a superfast broadband access service like the type to be provided by TPG over 
its fibre-to-the-basement networks should be the subject of access regulation. The inquiry 
will consider whether regulation is necessary to ensure that consumers in TPG-connected 
buildings can benefit from competitive retail markets for high-speed broadband services. 
In light of the decision by the ACCC, the Government is concerned that the competition 
objectives that Parts 7 and 8 were designed to achieve will not be achieved. Declaration by 
the ACCC of services on the network and comparable networks may address issues of access. 
However, the declaration process is long and uncertain.  Moreover, it will not address the 
fundamental issue Part 8 is intended to address, namely the operator of a new superfast 
network having the incentive and ability to favour its own downstream retail activity over 
those of other competitors. 
In this context on 11 September 2014, the Minister for Communications announced that he 
was proposing to consult industry on a new telecommunications licence condition, which 
would apply to all carriers. The licence condition would require owners of high-speed 
1 http://www.tpg.com.au/fttb. 
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 networks affected by the ACCC’s declaration process to functionally separate their wholesale 
operations, and to provide access to competing service providers on the same terms as it is 
provided to their own retail operations. This licence condition would remain in place for two 
years. Effectively, the licence condition would seek to close the gaps in Parts 7 and 8 that 
have been identified by TPG’s actions and the ACCC’s decisions, while the Government 
considers longer-term options. 
This regulatory impact statement addresses the Minister’s proposal to consider a new licence 
condition. 
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 Problem definition and the case for action 
Defining the problem 
In making Parts 7 and 8 of the Act, the Parliament has set out a clear statement of policy on 
superfast broadband. Parts 7 and 8 were inserted into the Act in the context of wide-ranging 
changes to the Australian telecommunications sector, which included significant changes to 
telecommunications legislation. The then Government had decided to roll out a national 
broadband network (NBN) as a wholesale-only network, operated by NBN Co, which was 
required under legislation to offer open and non-discriminatory access to all retail service 
providers. Strict regulatory limits were therefore placed on how NBN Co could operate. At 
the same time Telstra agreed to structurally separate its operations by migrating its customers 
onto the NBN. 
These twin outcomes reflected concerns that, in the past, the fixed-line local access network 
could be the focus of conduct to stifle the development of competition.  The majority of 
Australia’s local access networks were owned by one carrier, Telstra, which used its 
networks to supply retail services. However, it used the same networks to supply wholesale 
services to its competitors. Those competitors did not generally have access to alternative 
fixed-line networks. The network owner had the incentive and ability to favour its own 
downstream operations over those of its competitors.2  
Vertical integration can supply the owner of a monopoly network with strong incentives to 
undermine retail-level competition. 
After all, if there is a profit to be made at the retail level, the network owner would 
like to keep that profit for itself. If it is unable to do this by raising the network access 
fee to a monopoly level, then it will be tempted to undermine its retail competitors by 
reducing the quality of access services. As Australia’s recent experience of 
telecommunications regulation shows, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a regulator 
to prevent such discrimination by an integrated network operator.3 
The rollout of the NBN was intended to address vertical integration by delivering a level 
playing field for retail providers, with NBN Co being required to offer services on a 
wholesale-only, non-discriminatory basis. 
Any rollout by a carrier of vectored VDSL2 re-opens the competition concerns that the NBN 
and the structural separation of Telstra were intended to address. The particular issue of 
2 By contrast, the general access regime in part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 prohibits access 
price structures which allow a vertically integrated access provider to set terms and conditions that 
discriminate in favour of its downstream operations, except  to the extent that the cost of providing access to 
other operators is higher: see paragraph 44ZZCA(b). 
3 J. S. Gans and S. P. King (2010), ‘Big Bang’ Telecommunications Reform. The Australian Economic Review 
43(2), p.182. The Competition Policy Review (Draft Report September 2014, p.118) has also made the point 
that the absence of structural separation in telecommunications, and reliance on third-party access to a 
vertically integrated provider’s network, ‘has seen less fixed-line retail competition in telecommunications 
than might have been expected’. 
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 concern is whether, when vectored VDSL2 rollouts are in place, the normal operation of the 
market would ensure benefits for consumers.  End-users are more likely to receive benefits – 
such as lower prices and innovation – where there is the competitive supply of services. Such 
services can be delivered through separate access networks connecting to the same premises, 
or through services supplied by more than provider over a single access network. Generally 
speaking, where separate networks connect to the same premises, this will promote 
competition.  
Technical and financial issues, however, will mean that only one fixed-line vectored VDSL2 
network is likely to be connected to multi-dwelling units and business centres. In a 
submission to the Independent Cost-Benefit Analysis and Review of Regulation in March 
2014, the industry representative body, Communications Alliance, pointed out that any local 
access network supplying services using vectored VDSL2 will only function at its maximum 
capacity if there is a single operator: 
To reap the maximum performance benefits of vectoring and prevent service 
instability (e.g. dropouts) no more than one provider can offer vectored services 
within each cable sheath. This effectively means that there can only be one provider 
of VDSL2 network services in a node serving area or within a multiple dwelling unit 
or business centre development. This could be a wholesale-level provider, giving the 
opportunity for open access to enable other providers to offer services through the 
node.4 
The technical performance of a vectored VDSL2 network is optimised if only a single carrier 
connects fixed-lines from a node to premises and then accesses internal cabling in those 
premises. There will be a clear advantage for any carrier that is the first to connect vectored 
VDSL2 to a multi-dwelling unit or business centre. That carrier would have first access to the 
internal cabling. Although a second carrier could conceivably seek to deploy vectored 
VDSL2 from the same node and use the same cable sheath, this would lead to a significant 
reduction in technical performance for all vectored VDSL2 networks running from that node.  
Building owners are unlikely to agree to allow a second carrier to connect equipment on this 
basis, because tenants are unlikely to want premises offering inferior quality services. 
A carrier could connect its own fixed-line network to a building to which another carrier 
already supplies vectored VDSL2 by deploying an alternative technology, such as HFC or 
FTTP. However, in this case it would face significant additional costs. The costs of deploying 
new fibre cabling within apartment buildings are between $450 and $500 more per apartment 
than deploying fibre to the basement and using the existing in-building cabling.5 Any carrier 
deploying alternative network technologies may, therefore, be unable to recover its costs and 
compete with the vectored VDSL2 provider on price. 
4 Communications Alliance (2014), ‘Industry Paper on FTTN and VDSL2 Regulation.’ Submission to the 
Independent Cost-Benefit Analysis and Review of Regulatory Arrangements for the NBN Regulatory Issues 
Framing Paper,  p3. 
5 NBN Co (2013), Strategic Review December 2013, p.87. 
6 
 
                                                          
 Given these issues, in a separate submission to the Independent Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Review of Regulation, the ACCC noted that ‘the effective use of vectoring, and the 
accompanying higher data rates, requires a sole (monopoly) supplier. There may therefore be 
a need to reconcile technical difficulties with the objective of promoting competitive 
outcomes’.6 
A carrier that has connected a vectored VDSL2 network to premises does not have a statutory 
monopoly on access to those premises. However, the technical issues outlined above, and the 
resulting extra costs, mean that other service providers will be unlikely to duplicate the 
carrier’s network. In practice, therefore, where a carrier is the first provider to roll out a 
vectored VDSL2 network to a building it may enjoy an effective monopoly on the supply of 
fixed-line infrastructure to that building. 
Tenants in the building would still have access to alternative technologies such as wireless or 
mobile broadband. Those technologies are adequate for many consumer needs, but wireless 
and mobile technologies may not provide sufficient speed or bandwidth for business uses, 
and residential users may also consider that the low download limits (and corresponding high 
cost of usage over the download limit) of mobile technologies is less attractive than fixed-line 
technologies (which currently include unlimited download plans). 
The advantages that a vertically integrated provider has would be reduced if it chooses to, or 
is required to, supply wholesale services so that other providers can access its network and 
supply competitive services to end-users. It is possible that the ACCC’s declaration inquiry 
could result in the ACCC determining that it would be in the long-term interests of end-users 
for carriers with vectored VDSL2 networks to supply a wholesale service to other retail 
providers. However, the declaration process can take up to one year to complete, and the 
result is uncertain.7 Moreover, the declaration process cannot ensure that vectored VDSL2 
providers operate on a wholesale-only basis or supply wholesale services on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
Should the ACCC declare access to a service, the network operator (‘the access provider’) 
must supply that service to other carriers (‘access seekers’) in accordance with Standard 
Access Obligations (SAOs) set out in Part XIC of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(CCA). 
The SAOs require an access provider to supply a service and provide interconnection to an 
access seeker. In complying with the SAOs the access provider must ‘take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the technical and operational quality of the [service] is equivalent to that 
which the access provider provides to itself’.8 This has generally been interpreted narrowly – 
6 ACCC (2014), ACCC Submission to the Independent Cost Benefit Analysis Review of Regulation 
Telecommunications Regulatory Arrangements Paper (s.152EOA Review), p.21 (emphasis in original). 
7 Under Part XIC the ACCC must first conduct an inquiry to determine whether or not to declare a service 
(section 152AL); this process can take up to six months. If the ACCC decides to declare a service, it may make 
an  access determination in relation to the service. It must make the access determination within six months 
after it commences a public inquiry into making the determination (section 152BCK). 
8 Paragraphs 152AR(3)(b) and 152AR(5)(d) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
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 for example, ‘technical and operational quality’ may not cover many aspects of non-price 
terms such as timing of supply and provision of information. Furthermore, ‘equivalent’ in this 
section of the CCA does not mean ‘same’. Access providers are able to offer their own 
downstream operations quite different terms and conditions from those they offer to access 
seekers. The CCA therefore allows non-NBN Co providers to discriminate in favour of their 
own operations. 
In passing Parts 7 and 8 of the Act the Parliament reached a clear decision that non-NBN 
local access networks used to supply superfast carriage services to residential or small 
business customers should replicate the NBN outcomes. That is, they should operate on a 
wholesale-only, non-discriminatory basis. The limited exemptions were primarily for 
established, pre-existing networks that were capable of supplying superfast carriage services, 
or for minor extensions of those networks. However, the purpose of the law does not appear 
to be achieved if carriers ‘repurpose’ a network that was previously capable of supplying 
superfast carriage services and extend it by less than 1km to target residential or small 
business customers. 
Some industry members are concerned that a vertically integrated provider should not enjoy 
an effective monopoly over access to multi-dwelling units and business centres. iiNet argued 
that such networks should be wholesale-only and open access.9 Macquarie Telecom and 
Optus likewise argued that the 1km exemption under Parts 7 and 8 of the Act should be 
scrapped.10 
The crux of the issue, therefore, is what action needs to be taken to ensure that carriers who 
were not previously supplying a large number of superfast carriage services to residential and 
small business customers, but who are now proposing to do so, and who are not subject to 
Parts 7 and 8 of the Act, supply wholesale services over their networks, and do not favour 
their own retail operations over those of their wholesale customers. 
The case for action 
TPG’s proposal is not for a limited rollout. It is for an initial rollout affecting up to 500,000 
premises, which indicates that it may extend its network further (the Department estimates 
that TPG’s networks are within 1km of about 1.8 million premises, of which about 1 million 
are multi-dwelling units or business centres). The rollout is of such a scale that a significant 
proportion of premises in Australia will be affected. There are currently about 10 million 
fixed-line services in operation in Australia, and TPG’s rollout could therefore have an 
impact on at least five per cent of those services. Should other carriers elect to make use of 
the statutory 1km exemption, a substantial percentage of the population could then be 
covered. 
9 iiNet (2014) Cost-Benefit Analysis and Review of Regulatory Arrangements for the National Broadband 
Network. Telecommunications Regulatory Arrangements. Consultation Paper for the Purposes of Section 
152EOA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Submission by iiNet, p.10. 
10 Macquarie Telecom (2014), NBN Regulatory Review, p.4; Optus (2014), Submission in response to Review of 
Regulatory Arrangements for the National Broadband Network. Telecommunications Regulatory 
Arrangements, p.21. 
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 There is therefore a risk that, in the absence of action, carriers could roll out vectored VDSL2 
networks on a vertically integrated basis and re-open the competition issues that led in part to 
the decision to deploy the NBN and seek the structural separation of Telstra. In this context, it 
is worth emphasising that policy in this area does not start from a clean slate. The 
Government made an election commitment to complete the NBN as quickly and 
inexpensively as possible, and determined to retain the structural separation of Telstra and 
requirements on NBN Co to operate as a wholesale-only provider offering non-
discriminatory access to services. With these settings in place, Government action needs to be 
targeted to ensuring that they continue to operate effectively. 
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 Overview of options 
Five possible options have been identified to respond to the problem identified, although they 
would not all address the issues posed by the rollout of superfast local access networks 
targeting residential and small business customers that are not subject to sections 141 and 143 
of the Act. 
Option 1. Do nothing. End-users will have access to superfast carriage services, whether 
delivered by NBN Co or by another carrier over a vectored VDSL2 network (as explained 
above, it is unlikely that end-users will be offered competing fixed-line networks, given the 
costs and technical issues involved). Where the NBN is rolled out, retail providers will have 
access to a wholesale-only network supplying services on non-discriminatory terms. Where 
another carrier has rolled out a vectored VDSL2 network, that carrier could either supply 
wholesale services by choice or as a result of any declaration by the ACCC. 
Option 2. Repeal Parts 7 and 8 of the Act. This would allow open competition for the 
provision of infrastructure to all types of customer bases. Different providers would be free to 
roll out local access networks in different areas of the country, on a vertically integrated or 
wholesale-only basis. NBN Co could compete with these providers. Part XIC of the CCA 
would apply, so the ACCC could declare services if it considered doing so would be in the 
long-term interests of end-users. 
A variation to this option would be to retain Part 8 of the Act (but remove the 1km 
exemption), and establish a process whereby carriers could seek authorisation from the 
ACCC to operate on a vertically integrated basis. For example, carriers could submit 
undertakings to the ACCC, which could set out how a carrier proposes to ameliorate any 
competition issues. If accepted by the ACCC, the undertaking would effectively replace the 
Part 8 obligations. 
Option 3. Apply the Act as intended. Amend the Act to remove the 1km exemption and 
references to a line that is ‘capable of being used to supply’ a superfast carriage service. New 
networks or local access lines were generally expected to be subject to Parts 7 and 8, and the 
Act should therefore be revised to capture the original intention of the legislation. A new date 
of effect would need to be set out (e.g. 1 January 2017). Part XIC would also continue to 
apply. 
Option 4. The Minister could make a carrier licence condition (CLC). The CLC would apply 
to carriers that are not subject to sections 141 and 143 of the Act but supplying superfast 
carriage services to residential or small business customers (or residential customers alone). 
The CLC would require those carriers to establish legally- or functionally-separated retail and 
wholesale units, with the wholesale unit required to offer the same services to the retail unit, 
other carriers and service providers on the same terms and conditions. The CLC could also 
require carriers to offer a specific wholesale service. The CLC could be in place for a long or 
short period of time. It could be the mechanism of choice, or a transitional step to more 
permanent arrangements. 
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 Option 5. Combine option 4 and another approach – a CLC could be an interim step while the 
Government considers longer-term arrangements. 
A further option could include the addition of a levy mechanism as canvassed in the original 
Explanatory Memorandum for Parts 7 and 8 and proposed in recommendation 11 of the NBN 
Market and Regulatory Report prepared by the Vertigan panel. While the Government 
considers this option needs to be examined further, it has not been examined in detail as part 
of this process because the Government needs to take prompt action to resolve the issue at 
hand and such a levy mechanism would require significant analytical and developmental 
work.  
Regulatory impacts of options 
The following criteria have generally been considered in assessing the costs and benefits of 
the different options: 
• Does the option address incentives for a vertically integrated operator to favour its 
own retail operations? 
• Does the option impose divestment costs on a carrier? 
• Does the option impose ongoing or one-off compliance costs on a carrier? 
• Does the option promote the early rollout of infrastructure? 
• Does the option promote longer-term competition, and thereby create opportunities 
for greater operational and organisational efficiency, innovation and price reductions? 
• Does the option create regulatory distortions because carriers would not be subject to 
the same regulatory obligations? 
Option 1 – Do nothing 
Option 1 has the following advantages: 
• Carriers will be free to make investment decisions based on the current legal 
framework, rather than risk having investments overturned by changes to the law. 
• It allows the independent regulator to determine whether and what access services 
should be supplied over vectored VDSL2 networks. 
• End-users may gain access to superfast broadband services more quickly, either 
because a carrier connects a vectored VDSL2 network before the NBN, or NBN Co 
re-prioritises its rollout. 
• There are no ongoing or one-off divestment or separation costs. 
The option has the following disadvantages: 
• The option cannot ensure that a vertically integrated operator will not favour its 
downstream operations. The degree to which any provider favours its own operations 
could limit the degree to which competition provides benefits to consumers. 
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 o For example, a vertically integrated access provider may have incentives to 
limit access seekers’ access to information and innovative services, and to 
supply services at prices that favour its own operations. 
• If NBN Co is to compete with vectored VDSL2 suppliers it will need to re-prioritise 
its existing rollout plans. It currently operates under a general direction from the 
Government that, where feasible, it should prioritise areas of greatest need in its 
rollout. The need to compete with vectored VDSL2 operators could mean that it needs 
to re-prioritise areas which have a less clear need for superfast carriage services, and 
that areas of greater need therefore must wait longer for these services. 
• The option does not close a gap in the legislation that creates an artificial advantage 
for carriers over Telstra and other retail-only providers. Telstra is currently moving 
away from the supply of fixed-line services on a vertically integrated basis as required 
under its structural separation undertaking. However, while other providers operate on 
this basis, the same restrictions do not apply to other carriers, which will have 
incentives to create new effective monopolies where they have existing network 
assets. 
Option 1 would not lead to any increase in compliance costs for industry on its own. An 
ACCC declaration inquiry could lead to changes in the nature of operations currently 
envisaged by carriers such as TPG, but this is an independent process. 
Given the potential impacts of this option on competition and the artificial advantages created 
for carriers over Telstra and other retail-only providers, option 1’s benefits appear to be less 
than its costs. 
Option 2 – Repeal Parts 7 and 8 of the Act 
Option 2 has the following advantages: 
• It removes restrictions on carriers that make those carriers’ investment decisions more 
complex. Carriers could be free to operate their own networks on a vertically 
integrated or wholesale-only basis as they saw fit. This is likely to restore incentives 
for investment in competitive local access networks targeting residential and small 
business customers. 
• Such investments would allow carriers to compete more effectively with NBN Co, 
which would provide NBN Co with greater incentives to operate efficiently, innovate 
and provide services promptly. 
• The option would also allow any efficiency benefits from vertical integration to be 
captured. In particular, vertically-integrated carriers may develop services and prices 
that reflect end-users’ needs because they will have a more fundamental connection 
with end-users than a wholesale-only operator would have. There is a risk that 
wholesale-only entities can experience problems with the coordination of investment 
decisions with end-users’ needs. That said, coordination problems can be addressed 
through ongoing mechanisms for consultation between the wholesale-only provider 
and access seekers who do have direct relationships with end-users, and through 
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 flexible contracting arrangements that permit access seekers to request new products.  
(Such mechanisms also mean the competitive risks of vertical integration can be 
addressed.)  
• Option 3 does not confer any significant regulatory costs on industry. There may be 
some one-off costs as industry adjusts its business and operational systems to reflect 
the change in law, for example where carriers are currently complying with Parts 7 
and 8 and then wish to change their business models, but these are unlikely to be 
significant. In any event, under this option, it would be a commercial decision for a 
carrier to change its business model. 
• There are no ongoing or one-off divestment or separation costs. 
The disadvantages of option 2 are similar to those under option 1, but the option would also 
mean that, where carriers currently comply with part 8 of the Act, those carriers would no 
longer need to operate on a wholesale-only basis. This option could therefore encourage more 
network operators to re-integrate, because they may consider that they are more likely to 
achieve a higher return on their investments through operating on a vertically integrated 
basis. This option therefore could have the perverse result of ensuring that only NBN Co and 
Telstra are truly structurally separated, which therefore magnifies the fundamental policy 
concern that unequal obligations are imposed on a small subset of carriers. 
If the variation to this option (based on carriers submitting undertakings to the ACCC) were 
to be adopted, an additional layer of regulatory complexity and uncertainty would be set in 
place over and above the current arrangements. Carriers are likely to seek a more 
straightforward process, in which their operational choices are more clearly established and 
not subject to the whim of the regulator. That said, the variation to the option does provide a 
mechanism for any competition issues to be addressed up-front while allowing a carrier to 
retain any efficiency benefits of vertical integration and reduce the costs of divestment and 
separation. 
At present option 2 would allow a vertically integrated provider to favour its own retail 
operations and create an unequal set of obligations on different carriers seeking to invest in 
infrastructure and market retail services. The option may therefore limit the development of 
infrastructure competition, and this would indicate that its costs, over the long term, are likely 
to be outweighed by its benefits. Option 2 might be more attractive once the NBN is built, 
because a wholesale-only, non-discriminatory platform will then be available Australia-wide, 
and vertically integrated providers would therefore be unlikely to establish effective local 
access monopolies on any more than a very limited scale. Such carriers are unlikely to have 
incentives to roll out competitive infrastructure other than in new developments.   
Option 3 – Apply the Act as intended 
Option 3 has the following advantages: 
• The fundamental policy issues would be addressed – there would be no incentive for a 
carrier to seek to create an effective monopoly on local access where it has network 
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 assets, and no ‘dual’ system in which one set of obligations applies to Telstra but not 
to other carriers who may create effective monopolies. 
• Any vectored VDSL2 networks would be wholesale-only and supply services on a 
non-discriminatory basis, because Part 8 of the Act would clearly apply as intended. 
Access seekers would have a level playing field and access to a sufficiently ‘raw’ 
wholesale service (a Layer 2 bitstream service) to develop innovative products for 
end-users. 
• End-users would have access to a choice of retail providers, encouraging greater 
competition amongst service providers. 
Option 3 has the following disadvantages: 
• If carriers do not currently operate on a wholesale-only basis, option 3 would mean 
that they would have to structurally separate their operations in order to supply 
superfast carriage services to residential and small business customers. Carriers could 
face significant costs in divesting assets or business units, especially if the market 
were to take the view that any divestment was forced and therefore had the character 
of a fire sale. That said, the option provides a suitably long lead time (1 January 2017) 
for companies to adjust their operations. 
• Separation costs could be significant. These would include establishing separate 
business, operational and IT systems, separating staff members and assets between the 
different businesses, negotiating supply contracts between the two businesses, 
establishing a new compliance regime to ensure that functions remain separate and 
establishing a new reporting framework. 
• To the extent that a requirement to operate on wholesale-only and non-discriminatory 
basis encourages carriers not to roll out networks in competition with NBN Co, this 
would deter carriers from seeking to roll out vectored VDSL2 networks before NBN 
Co (or as an alternative to NBN Co, for example in new developments). As a result, 
some end-users may not receive the benefits of high-speed broadband as quickly as 
otherwise (for example, because their premises are further down NBN Co’s schedule). 
• Legislation can take a long time to pass through the Parliament and there can be no 
certainty for industry about future regulatory arrangements until it sees the final form 
of the legislation. The option therefore does not provide short-term certainty for 
industry. 
• The option does not address coordination problems caused by wholesale-only 
operators being cut off from end-users’ needs, though as noted above this issue can be 
addressed through consultation and contractual mechanisms. 
Overall, the costs of option 3 could be quite significant but it should be emphasised that they 
are discretionary costs. Businesses will have a choice how to structure their operations. In 
other words, the regulatory costs of option 3 are only imposed if a carrier decides that it 
wishes to supply superfast carriage services to residential (and/or small business customers) 
on a vertically integrated basis. 
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 Against these costs must be placed the benefits from ensuring that competition can develop 
adequately and that vertically integrated providers do not favour their own retail operations. 
Although those benefits are gained by access seekers, it should be noted that access providers 
who are required to operate on a non-discriminatory basis can continue to achieve profits 
from investments in network infrastructure. The benefits are difficult to quantify, but over the 
long term it could be argued that the benefits of imposing equitable arrangements that 
promote competition would include providing incentives for promoting innovation and lower 
overall prices for end-users. Over the long term, these benefits are more likely to outweigh 
the one-off adjustment costs of structural separation. 
Option 4 – Carrier Licence Condition 
Option 4 has the following advantages: 
• The fundamental policy issues would be addressed – there would be no incentive 
for a carrier to seek to create an effective monopoly on local access where it has 
network assets, and no ‘dual’ system in which one set of obligations applies to 
Telstra but not to other carriers who may create effective monopolies. 
• It is less intrusive than option 3. A vertically integrated provider could continue to 
operate on a vertically integrated basis, but would have to establish separate 
entities within its corporate structure along with strong ring-fencing arrangements 
to ensure that it did not favour its own operations. However, the carrier would not 
face divestment costs. 
• The option addresses the issue of vertical integration and ensures that access 
seekers will have access, on a non-discriminatory basis, to services. It is therefore 
more likely to deliver benefits in the long term, through enhanced competition, 
than either option 1 or option 2. 
• A CLC could be set in place fairly quickly, meaning that industry would gain 
legal certainty in a short period of time. By contrast, legislation can take some 
time to pass the Parliament and there is less certainty as to what its final shape 
may be. 
• The option does not address coordination problems caused by wholesale-only 
operators being cut off from end-users’ needs, though as noted above this issue 
can be addressed through consultation and contractual mechanisms. 
The disadvantages of option 4 are similar to those under option 3, in particular in relation to 
one-off separation costs, though these would be less significant because a carrier could 
continue to operate on a vertically integrated basis. Carriers may face initial costs in setting 
up legally separate retail and wholesale business entities and in establishing separate 
business, operational and IT systems for those entities so that the wholesale entity does not 
discriminate in favour of the retail entity. These costs are expected to be largely one-off in 
that, once adjusted, the systems should not need to be reset every year. It is not clear how 
great the costs might be; the overall quantum would depend upon the degree to which 
existing retail and wholesale systems are separated and the number and complexity of the 
systems. The costs would largely fall in the areas of differentiating business and operational 
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 systems, and also in establishing new compliance and reporting frameworks to ensure that the 
functions, staff and management of the two business entities are clearly separated. 
In the past, the costs of introducing functional separation elsewhere in the world have been 
quite significant. For example, the functional separation of British Telecom was estimated to 
have cost that carrier £153 million, largely through establishing Openreach as a separate 
entity and setting up new equivalence systems. Similarly, the functional separation of 
Telecom New Zealand was estimated to have cost that carrier NZ$200 million.11 However, in 
both of those cases the entity being separated was a highly integrated incumbent provider 
with national networks and many integrated lines of business developed over decades, with a 
wide mix of business and IT systems. The costs of imposing functional separation on a carrier 
with a much more limited scale and network are unlikely to be anywhere near these figures. 
Against these costs must be placed the benefits from ensuring equitable competition through 
a level playing field for retail providers. As noted under option 3, the benefits are also likely 
to be significant, and could involve fewer barriers to innovation and lower prices overall for 
end-users. Over the long term, the total benefits from option 4 could exceed the costs. 
Option 5 – Combine option 4 (short term) with long term legislative amendments 
Option 5 simply recognises that the Government could choose to adopt a staged approach to 
the problems posed by the rollout of vectored VDSL2 networks on a vertically integrated 
basis. A CLC could set short-term arrangements while the Government develops the optimal 
long term solution. The CLC, in other words, would provide short-term certainty that a 
vertically integrated provider would not favour its own operations, while the Government 
determines its longer-term approach. That could be to repeal Parts 7 and 8 of the Act once the 
NBN is built and fully operational, or to retain Parts 7 and 8 but close down the 1km 
exemption or adopt the model proposed in recommendations 3 and 4 and/or 11 of the NBN 
Market and Regulatory Report by the Vertigan panel. 
The compliance costs of this option would effectively be the same as those under option 4 – 
there would be one-off costs of establishing functionally separate businesses, and introducing 
systems to ensure non-discrimination. Extra costs would not be incurred if the law is later 
changed to permit carriers to submit ‘vertical integration’ undertakings under Part 8 of the 
Act (as suggested under option 2). However, if option 4 is adopted in the short term and 
option 3 is adopted in the long term, then the overall level of cost for a carrier could be 
higher, because it may be required to undertake functional separation in the short term and 
potentially structural separation in the long term. Although the costs of this could be 
significant, against them must be placed the benefits from enhancing competition. Over the 
long term, those benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. However, these are matters that 
would be considered fully in moving to the long term solution. 
 
11 Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (Competition and Consumer Safeguards) Bill 2010. Explanatory 
Memorandum, pp.30-31. 
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 Consultation 
There was extensive consultation in advance of the enactment of Parts 7 and 8. 
As noted above, submissions in early 2014 to the Vertigan review generally supported a 
monopoly provider of vectored VDSL2 networks, but also supported that provider operating 
on a wholesale-only, non-discriminatory basis. 
Under section 64 of the Act, before the Minister makes a CLC the Minister must provide a 
draft of the CLC to an affected carrier and invite the carrier to make a submission on the 
draft. The timeframe for the submission is 30 calendar days from the date the Minister 
provides the draft to the carrier. As a draft CLC on superfast carriage services could affect a 
number of carriers, the Minister will write to all licenced carriers in Australia, inviting 
submissions on the draft CLC. The Minister will also issue a media release and the 
Department of Communications will place a copy of the draft CLC and this Regulatory 
Impact Statement on the Department’s website. 
Further consultation will be undertaken in accordance with the Implementation section 
below. 
Selecting the best option 
The best option in the short-term is option 5. A CLC could be made in the short term and this 
addresses the fundamental policy issues and recognises the significant investments already 
made by the Government in the NBN and the structural separation of Telstra. The 
Government has announced that a CLC could apply for a two-year period. This would give it 
time to consider the optimal long term approach. In the longer term, when the NBN is built 
and fully operational, the issues posed by vertically integrated providers rolling out local 
access networks that are effective monopolies are less likely to be as significant. Access 
seekers would have the NBN as an open access fallback in areas where a vertically integrated 
provider overbuilds the NBN.  
Implementation and evaluation 
Option 5 would be implemented through the following steps: 
1. The Minister releases a draft CLC and calls for submissions on the draft. 
2. The Minister considers those submissions. If the Minister decides, having considered 
the submissions, to make the CLC, any changes identified through the consultation 
process could be incorporated into the draft. 
3. The Minister makes the CLC, which takes effect from the day after it is registered on 
the Federal Register of Legislative Instruments. The CLC would be a disallowable 
instrument. 
The CLC could be imposed for a limited period of time (two years) while the Government 
considers the optimal long term approach and develops appropriate legislation. 
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 The Government would evaluate the effectiveness of the CLC, including the nature of any 
impacts on carriers and on end-users, through its regular monitoring of industry 
circumstances and liaison with carriers and regulators. 
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